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Abstract
Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the 
moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use 
of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual’s capacity to reflectively 
decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, 
it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the 
main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to 
moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a vir-
tual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can 
teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, 
as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this 
better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.
Keywords Moral enhancement · Moral bioenhancement · Moral AIenhancement · 
Artificial intelligence · Virtual assistant · Ethical decision-making · Autonomy
Introduction
The latest technological advances could substantially change our way of being. It 
is a matter of debate in contemporary applied ethics whether or not to use these 
advances to enhance ourselves as moral agents. In this article, I will argue that, pro-
vided some conditions are met, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) could be the 
most appropriate in this regard.
To do so, I will devote the first section to analysing the current proposals for 
“moral enhancement” of human beings through two different technologies in 
order to show, in my opinion, which path should not be taken in this matter. I will 
begin with the proposals that draw upon the use of the latest advances in neurosci-
ence, and specifically biotechnology, which I will include under the term “moral 
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bioenhancement”. I will argue that they do not achieve their objective because they 
neglect the notion that an individual’s morality cannot be strengthened without tak-
ing their autonomy seriously. In the rest of the section, I will attempt to prove that it 
is precisely this same error that also invalidates the positions of those who have hith-
erto defended that what we need to morally enhance human beings is not biotechnol-
ogy but rather another new field of technological expansion: AI. These positions are 
encompassed under the neologism “moral AIenhancement”.
The conclusions of the first section will serve to devise, in the second section, a 
virtual assistant that, through various AI-related technologies, truly strengthens our 
morality thanks to its effectiveness in fostering personal autonomy. I will argue that 
the assistant should seek the maximum deliberative preparation of the user through 
a dialogue of clear Socratic inspiration, but must be governed by procedural ethical 
criteria that ensure axiological neutrality.
Even so, it is worth challenging this proposal as to whether we need a virtual 
assistant for something that could be achieved, to an equal or greater extent, with 
an ethical human instructor implementing a similar method. In the final section, I 
will therefore perform a comparison between the proposed virtual assistant and its 
human counterpart. The comparison will lead me to conclude that, as long as certain 
precautions are taken, the virtual option is preferable.
No Enhancement Without Autonomy
The Passivity of the Bioenhancement Process
The ethical debate on moral enhancement dates back to the beginning of the cen-
tury and has focused, most of the time, on moral bioenhancement (Agar, 2010, 
2015; Douglas, 2008; Faust, 2008; Harris, 2016; Persson & Savulescu, 2008). 
Most authors in support of this largely believe that any biological intervention that 
strengthens certain moral emotions or motivations, such as altruism, or reduces 
other immoral ones, such as aggression, represents an enhancement in itself (Pers-
son & Savulescu, 2008, 2012; Douglas, 2008, 2013; Crockett, 2014; Earp et  al. 
2018)1 However, this is a misguided approach since it fails to realise that the price 
to pay for these kinds of interventions is usually the erosion of personal autonomy. 
Autonomy must be safeguarded because it is a crucial factor for well-being and the 
definition of what a person is. This is why some authors believe that the promotion 
of this capacity is the foundation of political and moral systems (Mill, 1859/1975: c. 
3, Sen, 2010, p. 18). This being so, it would be inaccurate to claim that a biological 
intervention that reduces autonomy can lead to a "moral enhancement" of people.
1 Although this has been the dominant trend, there have also been authors who have questioned the 
moral effectiveness of focusing on motivational aspects and have argued instead for the desirability of 
increasing by biotechnological means either the moral agent’s deliberative domain (Harris 2016) or both 
the cognitive and the emotional (DeGrazia 2014).
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But in what sense can it be argued that such interventions erode autonomy? This 
could be argued in two ways. The first would be to point out that if by changing the 
person’s biology we increase his willingness to do the right thing, we are consider-
ably reducing his behavioural options. We would be depriving him of the possibil-
ity of doing the wrong thing, of the "freedom to fall" (Harris, 2011). But, as some 
authors have argued, not having action alternatives to choose from does not make 
one less free (Savulescu & Persson, 2012, p. 409; Douglas, 2013; DeGrazia, 2014, 
pp. 5–7). To see this, Savulescu and Persson (2012) ask us to imagine an intelligent 
computer, the "God Machine", which allows people to act freely as long as this does 
not entail great harm or injustice. They argue that, even if in such a hypothetical situ-
ation, people’s real choices were fewer, they would still be acting freely. This would 
explain our usual belief that people who, because of their moral zeal, consider no 
alternative but to do the right thing, are no less free than immoral people (Persson & 
Savulescu, 2013, p. 128). Therefore, what moral enhancement, be it biotechnologi-
cal or educational, would achieve in this case is not a limiting of autonomy, but the 
possibility “to make the unacceptable unpalatable, not undoable” (Harris, 2013, p. 
170, in a different context).
So, when I argue that bioenhancement entails an erosion of personal autonomy, 
I mean it in a second sense. I do not wish to refer to autonomy as the possibility 
of acting otherwise (of choosing the "moral fall"), but as self-determination, that 
is, relating it more directly to the will of the individual than to its results (on the 
distinction, see Ekstrom, 2012). In this other sense, actions are autonomous when 
they are governed by the individual, not by an external will. This means two things. 
First of all, that the individual must identify with the values underlying the action, 
and with the judgments derived from them, after having subjected them to some 
rational consideration. The individual must be able to make sense of his life from a 
higher perspective that reflects on his acquired ("first-order") preferences, desires, 
values, etc. (Dworkin, 1988, p. 25; 1989; Frankfurt, 1971; Arneson, 1991). But, 
secondly, autonomy as self-determination also means that the individual must have 
sufficient self-confidence, resolve and self-control to act in accordance with these 
values and judgments (Berofsky, 1995; Dworkin, 1976; Haworth, 1986). As recent 
empirical studies show (Moll et al., 2005; Wiseman, 2016; Casebeer and Churland 
2003; Decety & Howard, 2013, pp. 49, 53; Pascual et al. 2013; Young & Dungan, 
2012), autonomous moral decisions always involve an interaction of the affective, 
the cognitive and the motivational. We can say that a person is involved with his 
or her values and that he or she considers them truly his or her own when, to the 
extent of his or her possibilities, he or she is willing to behave by them. In this sense, 
we can say that an individual chooses their values autonomously when they are the 
result of a balance between capacities or attitudes of both an affective and rational 
nature reached personally by the individual. It is a balance that continues to exist 
whenever the person also uses these capacities and attitudes to make decisions, to 
flexibly deliberate on what to do in a given situation (Schaefer, 2015; Earp et  al. 
2018, Carter & Gordon, 2015). It is an internal balancing act which, despite occa-
sionally being facilitated by experience or by following simple, useful and justified 
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In what way, then, could the change in moral emotions sought by the advocates 
of bio-enhancement negatively affect this capacity for self-determination? In a 
first sense, it would do so if the change were made against the manifest will of the 
subject. Even if it were for its own sake, to impose it coercively would constitute 
an inadmissible paternalism in the sense, defended by Dworkin (1972, p. 83), of 
externally interfering in the values that are decisive in the life of the individual. The 
individual would be drastically stripped of something as important as having a say 
in the constitution or modification of his or her own identity (Klincewicz 2016, p. 
183). But what I am arguing here is that, with such interventions, this ’silencing’ 
would still be present, in a way, even when they are carried out with the individual’s 
consent since the two basic elements of self-determination would be undermined in 
such cases. Firstly, by aiming primarily at influencing attitudes, the techniques are 
used in a way that bypasses reasoning (Harris, 2014, p. 372), which leads to giv-
ing the subject in the process the role of a mere "passive recipient" (Schaefer, 2015, 
p. 268; Raus et al., 2014; Schermer, 2015). This is what makes it crucially differ-
ent from other traditional forms of moral ’enhancement’, such as cognitive therapy 
or education at advanced ages, where significant involvement and effort is usually 
required from the individuals to enhance (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015). In these 
other participatory interventions, there is room for the subject to progressively delib-
erate on the changes taking place within him/her and, if he/she does not identify 
with them, to withdraw from the intervention or to select which changes to accept. 
This is not the case, however, when the intervention involves a direct alteration of 
the nervous system in order, for example, to make the individual more altruistic.
But it is not only a question of these interventions limiting the deliberative capac-
ity of the subject. They also negatively affect that second element of autonomy hav-
ing to do with authenticity. While it is true that beliefs, desires and personality traits 
are dynamic, changes in these psychological factors must be incorporated into one’s 
’life story’ in a coherent way, and without compromising the sense of self. This 
is similar to what Dworkin (1972) demanded of methods of social influence: that, 
in addition to not dispensing with the participation of individuals, they should not 
cause sudden discontinuities in their unified conception of themselves. It is precisely 
this narrative identity that could be abruptly affected by the immediate changes of 
bio-enhancement (Focquaert & Schermer, 2015, pp. 145–146; Schechtman, 2010). 
Some studies show that patients who undergo deep brain stimulation find it difficult 
to come to terms with the psychological and functional changes that this technique 
brings about and to adopt a new self-image (Gisquet, 2008). In some cases, they 
become depressed because they feel alienated or confused by their new identities 
(Schechtman, 2010, p. 137).
There are two possible responses to my criticism of moral bioenhancement for its 
excessive conditioning of the subject. The first would be to argue that, in certain sit-
uations and if conducted properly, intervention in moral emotions could be compat-
ible with the active participation of the subject and, therefore, not erode autonomy; 
it may even increase it. Savulescu and Persson (2012, pp. 411–412) propose the 
hypothetical case of a pill that "clarifies the view" that a usually selfish person has of 
the other, thus allowing his or her moral deliberation to be more complete and moti-
vating. Even so, they add, decision-making would still require effort and learning. 
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Other authors make similar arguments concerning bioenhancement as increasing 
"moral impulse control" (Earp et al., 2015) or neutralising counter-moral emotions 
(Douglas, 2008), presenting it, therefore, as liberating us from that which prevents 
us from being truly autonomous. The problem with these bioenhancement propos-
als is that, given the foreseeable neurological advances, they cannot be implemented 
in the near future, as some of their advocates acknowledge (Douglas, 2008, p. 166). 
To really increase moral attitudes without simultaneously undermining autonomy 
would require a difficult "fine-tuning" of emotions that would be sensitive to the var-
ied particularity of individuals and the circumstances they may face. Without such a 
technical possibility, moral bioenhancement could be counterproductive, depriving 
individuals, for example, of the ability to express the right, sometimes necessarily 
aggressive, reactions to grave injustices (Chan & Harris, 2011, p. 131; Harris, 2011, 
p. 105; Dees, 2011, p. 13).
The second possible response to the above critique of moral bioenhancement 
would be, while acknowledging the threat to personal autonomy, to maintain that 
this could be compensated for by the increased well-being and quality of life for 
many beings that the increased moral motivation of the enhanced people would 
bring (DeGrazia, 2014; Savulescu & Persson, 2012, p. 416). It could even be added 
that such gains could justify that sometimes, as with medical interventions, enhance-
ment is carried out at the risk of possible accidents, cognitive limitations or unin-
tended negative effects (Douglas, 2013).
I will not assess here the acceptability of this possible counterargument, but I will 
consider it as a point of reference to ask, in the rest of the article, whether such posi-
tive achievements of moral enhancement could be achieved with AI in a better way, 
i.e. without diminishing personal autonomy and without the risks currently associ-
ated with the use of biotechnology for this purpose.
Ethics Machines, Nudges and Ethical Advisors
Moral AIenhancement is a good alternative because, by not aiming to directly 
change motivational aspects of behaviour, it would, in principle, pose less risk to 
autonomy. Let’s see how well this expectation is fulfilled in each of the three models 
I envision in the emerging debate on moral AIenhancement.
The first model would consist of an extrapolation to this debate of some achieve-
ments in what is known as “machine ethics”. The objective of this field is to con-
tribute to the configuration of autonomous and robotic machines so that they can 
function by themselves in morally difficult situations following ethical criteria. For 
example, system designers might equip driverless vehicles with algorithms allow-
ing them to choose between the different victims of their possible reactions in una-
voidable accidents. Some authors suggest that we could use these kinds of advances 
in machine ethics to design “ethics machines”, systems that direct the behaviour 
of human beings, either by replacing them completely when making decisions 
(Dietrich, 2001), or by overriding or correcting them (Gips, 1995). They justify the 
heavy dependence on machines that this would entail for humans by the supposedly 
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unwavering impartiality, consistency and equanimity of the former, and the egoism, 
deliberative fatigue and group favouritism characteristic of the latter.2
Whether or not this justification of the model is valid, there are reasons to doubt 
its viability. But what interests me here is to highlight another major deficiency of 
the model: its negative impact on personal autonomy. If to do the right thing, we 
need only obey a machine whose ethical algorithms are determined from the per-
spective of the designer, our role will always be largely passive and the reasons to 
behave morally will always come from the outside ((Lara & Deckers, 2020, pp. 277, 
279–280).
We could then consider a second moral AIenhancement model in which, in order 
to protect the autonomy of the user, the recommendations of the machine could be 
rejected at any time. To do so, we could make use of nudges, widely discussed since 
being popularised by Sunstein and Thaler (2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), espe-
cially in the commercial and public health fields. A nudge is any aspect of a choice 
architecture, or decision-making environment, that aims to influence people to sup-
posedly make better decisions for their welfare whilst always leaving their freedom 
of choice intact, i.e., not prohibiting particular choices or significantly changing 
incentives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Sunstein, 2015a, pp. 7–8). The vagueness of 
this definition, however, means that nudges can encompass a wide variety of inter-
ventions. For example, strategies that aim to influence behaviour by simply provid-
ing information, such as making apples more visible than unhealthy products in a 
cafeteria (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) or displaying a certain route on a GPS device, 
would be nudges. In such cases, highlighting or simply providing certain informa-
tion can be considered a nudge because, by virtue of the fact that such informa-
tion usually elicits a similar reaction from people, it is expected to alter behaviour 
in a predictable way. But there are also more sophisticated nudges that draw on a 
deeper knowledge of human behaviour, particularly with regard to certain decision-
making heuristics or biases that we often utilise in order to make decisions quickly 
and according to certain cognitive cues rather than to all the available information. 
Some nudges therefore aim to improve the individual’s decision-making by getting 
the individual to block such cognitive shortcuts, warning, for example, of the con-
venience of undergoing a period of reflection before taking a certain action. Finally, 
there are the more ethically problematic nudges which aim, by changing the choice 
architecture, to trigger these shortcuts to steer people’s behaviour in specific direc-
tions (Barton & Grüne-Yanoff, 2015, p. 343).
Some authors have suggested that nudges could inspire the design of robots that 
promote the necessary attitudes and skills for humans to behave by following some 
ethical standards (Borenstein & Arkin, 2016; Klincewicz, 2019). Although these 
proposals would specifically target robots to take advantage of certain benefits of a 
2 Dietrich (2001, p. 531) is so pessimistic about the moral nature of human beings, and so optimistic 
about the possibilities of AI, that he advocates an obligation to "usher in our own extinction" in order to 
create a better world inhabited solely by ethical robots. These robots, which he calls “Homo sapiens 2.0”, 
would be improved versions of ourselves because they would have achieved that "Copernican turn" —
unattainable to us due to our biological conditioning— which allows one to act from the belief that one is 
not the centre of the universe (Dietrich 2001, pp. 532–533, 536).
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humanoid chassis, such as emotive influence (Asada et al., 2009), gesture commu-
nication (Brooks & Arkin, 2007) or the inspiration of more authority (Aroyo et al., 
2018), they could also be implemented in simple computer programmes (Klince-
wicz, 2019, pp. 426–427).
The impact of these proposals on user autonomy will depend on the type of nudge 
they are based on. It will not negatively affect autonomy, and may even improve 
it, if the proposal lends special importance to those nudges that, ultimately, aim 
to enhance the user’s decision-making by encouraging them to be more reflective 
in certain situations. Such is the case, for example, of the proposal by Klincewicz 
(2019), who proposes designing social robots that enhance user morality by inclin-
ing them towards strategies in line with the practical advice of the ancient Stoic phi-
losophers. The nudges would serve here to free the user from those emotional blocks 
that normally hinder our cold and efficient reflection, such as worrying about issues 
whose resolution is beyond our control, ruminating about past events or not realising 
the irrationality of many of our emotions (Klincewizc, 2019, pp. 436–439).
Quite different is the case of those proposals that resort to nudges to trigger deci-
sion-making heuristics that incline the user’s decision to certain substantive ethi-
cal stances. An example would be the one suggested, in merely illustrative terms, 
by Borenstein and Arkin (2016). These would be companion robots designed to, 
by means of (dis)incentive strategies similar to those that humans use with each 
other, foster beliefs and attitudes in accordance with Rawls’ principles of justice. 
User autonomy could certainly be thought to be safeguarded in this model because, 
although the ultimate goal of nudges is to increase the likelihood of one option being 
chosen, in pushing the individual in one specific direction, they do so with a liber-
tarian paternalism that, while intending the best for the individual, always preserves 
their freedom to oppose (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 4–6). However, the objection 
can always be raised that this preserved freedom is minimal and insufficient pre-
cisely because these types of nudges aim to subtly alter the behaviour of the individ-
ual. Instead of influencing through reason and arguments, the heuristics-triggering 
nudges take advantage of some of the character traits of the individual to achieve 
an easier adherence to the aims of the designer. In other words, the very tactic that 
characterises these nudges entails in itself an attempt to circumvent the deliberative 
capacities of the individual, thus significantly limiting autonomy (Ashcroft, 2013; 
Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welch, 2010; MacKay & Robinson, 2016; Saghai, 2013; 
Wilkinson, 2013; Yeung, 2012). This intended adherence of the individual to the 
external aims would correspond more to immediate, superficial and blind accept-
ance than to a reflective personal identification with them. Some authors even argue 
that the threat to autonomy posed by nudges comes from their supposedly manipu-
lative nature. Manipulation occurs when one influences another by bypassing their 
capacity for reason, either by taking advantage of the non-rational elements of their 
psychology or by influencing their decisions in a non-transparent way that is not 
obvious to the subject. This is precisely what happens, these authors point out, in 
certain nudges (Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012, p. 5; Hausman & Welch, 
2010, p. 136; Grüne-Yanoff, 2012, pp. 636–637).
In the case of technological nudges, such as those that could be used for this 
model of moral AIenhancement, the threat to autonomy would be even greater. In 
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contrast to other types of influences, the nudging that would be possible through AI 
assistants, whether robotic or not, would benefit from the technology’s own ability 
to find useful correlations between data "not capable of analysis by ordinary human 
assessment" (Shaw, 2014). It would be a kind of “hypernudging”, especially subtle, 
unobtrusive and tremendously powerful. By learning from the user’s past behaviours 
and preferences, the assistant could constantly and dynamically update the choice 
architecture in a way that would make preferable behavioural options more appeal-
ing (Yeung, 2017). Moreover, this hypernudging of assistants would make it impos-
sible to fulfil that condition of publicity and transparency that, for some authors, 
would render nudges non-manipulative, making them "visible, scrutinized and 
monitored" (Sunstein, 2015b, pp. 147–148). The assistants would be designed with 
influence mechanisms based on complex machine learning algorithms, which would 
make them highly opaque (Yeung, 2017, p. 124).
It can therefore be concluded that autonomy may not be sufficiently respected in 
either of the models presented because, in one way or another (replacing or pushing 
in one direction), the subject’s values are not the determining factor. This could be 
avoided if the computer programme were designed with the sole intention of assist-
ing the user in moral decision-making. The result would be an ethical advisor that 
would provide the user with guidelines which, in addition to being subject to rejec-
tion or revision at any time, would be based on the user’s own moral values. This 
would be the underlying idea for what we could consider a third moral AIenhance-
ment model and which has been laid out in two proposals, Savulescu and Maslen 
(2015), on the one hand, and Giubilini and Savulescu (2017), on the other. In the 
first, the user would choose and organise, by virtue of their priorities, the basic val-
ues from a list provided by the system. The advisor would then process the informa-
tion at its disposal according to this hierarchy of values and recommend guidelines 
of moral behaviour to the user. In the second proposal of this model, Giubilini and 
Savulescu, the user must choose a version of the advisor system that fits their per-
sonal values. Then, from the version chosen, the system would suggest the decisions 
that a hypothetical ideal observer (omniscient, imaginative, disinterested, dispas-
sionate and consistent) who shares a value perspective with the individual, would 
adopt in certain particular situations.
With regard to the previous models, these two proposals would lead to an 
advancement in terms of autonomy since, in both cases, the involvement of the user 
is solicited in the determination of what is correct, conditioning the entire process to 
their particular values and final approval. But is the increase in autonomy achieved 
with this model significant? Can it be asserted that a moral enhancement in the user 
would truly occur? If we adopt the view that moral enhancement consists of increas-
ing the competency to autonomously choose one’s own decisions, I do not consider 
this third model to be suitable either. Once the subject has chosen the reference val-
ues required by the system, without the need for any reflection, their role is reduced 
to either accepting the result of the deliberation of the virtual advisor or not. And 
if it is ultimately accepted, their identification with the prescriptions recommended 
by the advisor will not be the result of a reflective process. The user can engage lit-
tle in the reflection or deliberation on moral judgments if they arise entirely from 
the system and are based on a totally external process of determination. As it is not 
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necessary to understand the rational connections between the values entered into 
the system and its conclusions, it is foreseeable that their moral abilities will not 
improve and that, without the help of the advisor, the person would continue mak-
ing the same decisions as before, without any progress. Moreover, this interpreta-
tion of the relationship between the advisor and the user is hardly conducive to the 
user reconsidering their position. The user can indeed, at any time, change the per-
sonal values provided to the system, but it is unlikely they will do so. Savulescu and 
Maslen (2015, p. 92) recognise this when they assert that the use of their proposed 
enhancement system could encourage deference more than "deep reflection". As 
people are generally reluctant to change their moral values, it is foreseeable that they 
would be even more so if they believed that their decision was based on the advice 
of a supposedly reliable computer system (Lara & Deckers, 2020, p. 281).
In conclusion, the four moral enhancement models examined thus far —the bio-
technological as well as the three based on AI— are unviable because they result in 
either a decrease or at least no increase in personal autonomy. Focusing on directly 
altering the moral behaviour of individuals, they neglect that this cannot be done 
unless a particular condition is met, namely that the behavioural change is a genuine 
process of self-determination. These models can thus only derive interventions or 
assistance more akin to mere behavioural control, rather than prepare the individual 
to make moral decisions. In short, it could be said that the models, despite having 
emerged with the intention to strengthen morality, are ultimately only able to over-
ride it.
SocrAI, the Socratic Assistant
To overcome this deficiency in the autonomy of the previous models, in this section, 
I will formulate an alternative proposal of moral AIenhancement. It will consist of 
an expanded version of the virtual assistant that Jan Deckers and I devised in an 
article published in the journal Neuroethics (Lara & Deckers, 2020). It was inspired 
by the dialectical method adopted by Socrates in his dialogues, which aimed to help 
his interlocutors to reach definitions of concepts, usually of some virtue, on their 
own. The key difference between the Socratic approach and ours was that we used 
the method to promote moral learning. The interaction between the virtual assis-
tant and the human user would be based on continuous questioning and aimed at 
developing the user’s capacities to evaluate and establish moral beliefs and values 
following requirements of empirical, conceptual, logical-argumentative and ethical 
rigour (Lara & Deckers, pp. 283–284).
An Artificial Agent with a Hybrid Design
It is important to start by considering the technical characteristics that could make 
the assistant I propose here, which I will call SocrAI, a reality. It would be a conver-
sational bot, in principle without a robotic "body". It could be categorised as a moral 
machine or an Artificial Moral Agent (AMA) and as such, it would be "capable 
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of engaging in autonomous moral reasoning, that is, moral reasoning without the 
direct real-time input from a human user" (Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019, p. 721). It 
would therefore meet the three essential criteria of an AMA: interactivity, autonomy 
and adaptability (Floridi & Sanders, 2004, pp. 357–358). SocrAI would have the 
capacity to respond to environmental inputs which, in this case, would be the user’s 
answers to its questions (interactivity); it would itself make ethical judgements about 
the user’s answers, in particular about whether or not they meet the aforementioned 
normative requirements of empirical, conceptual, logical-argumentative and ethi-
cal rigour (autonomy) and would act by applying these ethical judgements, without 
real-time human input, to formulating questions and suggestions to the complex and 
novel situations that users would pose with their different previous answers (adapt-
ability). Still, it should be clear that we are not talking here about a full ethical bot, 
at the highest level of Moor’s (2009) gradation of AMAs, with consciousness, inten-
tionality and free will.3 Rather, SocrAI would be at Moor’s previous level (Level 3), 
in the group of "explicit ethical agents", those bots that would use ethical categories 
as part of their programming, not simply to govern their behaviour according to spe-
cific guidelines, but to make it the result of an explicit representation of ethical prin-
ciples (Anderson & Anderson, 2007, p. 15). AMAs at this level "have general prin-
ciples or rules of ethical conduct that will be adjusted or interpreted to fit various 
kinds of situations" (Moor, 2009, p. 20). Another difference between these AMAs 
and those of the top level is that their scope is usually restricted, thus being governed 
by a "narrow artificial intelligence", which, unlike the "general" one, assumes a high 
degree of functionality within a limited scope (Bostrom, 2014). SocrAI would thus 
constitute an AMA whose ethical programming would ultimately serve to improve 
the moral education of users. This means that when designing it, in addition to the 
aforementioned normative requirements of good deliberation, requirements exclu-
sive to an educational purpose would have to be taken into account, thus rendering 
the assistant ineffective for some other field.
Under the above characterisation of SocrAI as an AMA, the most promising 
way to design it would be according to a "hybrid" strategy, combining "top-down" 
principles and "bottom-up" learning (Wallach & Allen, 2009), albeit in a different 
way to that commonly used in current embedded ethics proposals for autonomous 
machines. In principle, the goal in our case is different: it is not about the machine 
doing the right thing, but about instructing the user so that he or she is better able to 
do it. Therefore, the instruction itself is not based on substantive ethical principles, 
but rather on general guidelines on how to reason better. In order to design SocrAI, 
therefore, it would be these guidelines (the normative requirements mentioned 
above) that would have to be codified in AI, so that they could be applied to specific 
cases, namely by evaluating the user’s responses according to such guidelines. In 
principle, this would allow for an easier design of the assistant as it would avoid 
the main problem of the primary top-down proposals, which, based on substantive 
3 There is much debate about whether it will ever be possible to have a conscious machine (Peterson 
2012; Torrance 2008; Wallach 2010) and whether consciousness, intentionality and free will are inescap-
able features of full moral agency (Floridi & Sanders 2004; Gunkel 2014; Himma 2009; Sparrow 2012).
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ethical principles, found it difficult to create algorithms that resolved the frequent 
conflicts between them. Even expertly agreed meta-principles would not be suffi-
cient to resolve these conflicts (Wallach & Allen, 2009, pp. 84–97). However, if the 
normative criteria by which the virtual assistant is to be programmed will only be 
formal, of mere argumentative rigour, it is foreseeable that they will be consistent 
most of the time. The criterion of conceptual precision will seldom be at odds, for 
example, with argumentative logic or empirical support.
This search for a machine that does not seek to do the ethically correct thing in its 
operation or to advise the user in that respect also frees us from the problems most 
common to bottom-up proposals (about these problems, see Wallach & Allen, 2009, 
p. 110). Since the objective is only to solicit a better argument, there is no need to 
fear that the assistant, in learning its own strategies to optimise results, will end up, 
as would happen with other AMAs, doing or recommending what is in itself wrong, 
thus undoing or overriding built-in restraints. There would therefore be no problem 
if, for example, to get the user to be more conceptually precise, SocrAI learned that 
it would be better not to point out his inaccuracies, but to continue his arguments 
with them until the end. Nor would it be exposed to the dangers to the ethics of 
allowing the machine to learn what is right from a generalisation of specific cases. 
On the contrary, his learning from experience would be of great use to SocrAI, both 
to update the normative requirements so that they are more versatile for new user 
reactions and to increase its functional skills (data input, dialogic communication, 
argumentation, etc.). This should follow the lead of IBM’s Project Debater, the first 
AI system that debates complex issues with humans and which would be an essen-
tial reference for the design of SocrAI. Project Debater configures its reasoning with 
data mining through supervised learning algorithms that analyse countless docu-
ments from legal and academic databases such as LexisNexis. The system collects 
well-structured arguments from these databases and extracts key phrases such as 
evidence for or against an assertion in order to construct its own argument (Slonim 
et al., 2021). Recently, the quality of the evidence that the system finds has improved 
considerably thanks to the adoption of BERT, the neural network for processing nat-
ural language created by Google. Thanks to the bidirectional (contextual) analysis 
of the words, it allows the search engine algorithms to better understand the user’s 
language and respond more efficiently to their queries. But these achievements may 
be insignificant compared to those obtainable from the possible use of GPT-3, a 
powerful 175 billion parameter language generator developed by OpenAI. Unlike 
other models, it does not require pre-training on a large text corpus or fine-tuning to 
successfully perform a specific language task. GPT-3, by contrast, approaches the 
human ability to perform a whole range of tasks based on just a few instructions 
and examples (producing poetry, computer programming, music, jokes, articles and 
other results, frequently indistinguishable from human productions). The mining of 
arguments used by Project Debater is also being developed to be able to evaluate the 
quality of the arguments, for example, by detecting cognitive biases (Heaven, 2020).
However, it is important to qualify that, although Project Debater and GPT-3 are 
important techniques to consider for implementing the virtual assistant I am propos-
ing, they will require significant adaptation to the purposes of this virtual assistant. 
Note that these techniques are aimed at achieving computational systems that argue 
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in the most convincing way for a human user or listener. In our case, such rhetori-
cal possibilities should be redirected towards the goals of our Socratic enhancement 
project.
Having outlined some guidelines for the design of SocrAI, in what follows I 
will argue that this virtual assistant could be the realisation of a moral enhance-
ment model that not only respects but also increases moral autonomy. SocrAI 
would achieve this thanks to three traits that would differentiate it from the mod-
els presented thus far: educational guidance, full participation of the user and value 
neutrality.
Educational Guidance and Full Participation of the User
Essential for the increase in autonomy, first, is the fact that the aim of this assistant 
is not to directly and immediately alter the behaviour of the person (as in the case of 
bioenhancement or the other AIenhancement proposals). The objective now would 
be for the user, with the exercise of their deliberative capacities, to learn to decide 
better and, with time, this would favour the ability to do so on one’s own. Thanks 
to the inquisitive dialogue, the virtual assistant will make the person aware of their 
possible errors and they will feel motivated, where appropriate, either to respond as 
to why they believe they are not errors or to avoid them with revised positions.4 It is 
foreseeable that, with this dialectical training, the person will acquire the capacity to 
make decisions critically and self-sufficiently in the future.5
Second, SocrAI would strengthen the autonomy of the user because, thanks to 
this constant interaction, the user would be compelled to achieve a high degree of 
participation in the enhancement process. In the previous models it could be said 
that the involvement of the individual was either zero—the enhancement a result 
of either biological interventions or highly controlled computer systems—, or mod-
est—limited to providing values and to either accepting the conclusive recommen-
dation of the advisor or not. In all of them, it could be said that technology, in one 
way or another, decided for the individual. However, with SocrAI, the individual 
4 To concretise the idea of moral progress that should inspire SocrAI’s educational pretension, the Sto-
ics’ conception of the sage, a figure from whom these philosophers derived their practical advice for 
a virtuous and happy life, would also be very useful. A sage whom, by the way, they identified with 
Socrates. Thus, in line with the Socratic method’s claims to self-reflection and coherence, SocrAI should 
be seen to acquire the Stoic skills of pointing out to the user how some of his mistakes depend on a blind 
and quick acceptance of emotions, irrational fears (about matters beyond our control) and an excessively 
materialistic and self-centred outlook. The Stoics were convinced that perceiving the sources of these 
types of errors was an essential element of an "examined life", as claimed by Socrates. On the practical 
advice of the Stoics and the influence on them of the figure of Socrates and his method, see, for example, 
Pigliucci (2017, pp. 201–221); Adamson (2015, pp. 73–100); Brown (2006).
5 The dialectical process could be accompanied by other types of activities that share this educational 
purpose. Due to their virtual condition and their derivation from AI, particularly relevant here would be 
"serious games", video games designed more for learning than for entertainment (Abt 1987, p. 9). Thus, 
Staines  et al. (2019) propose Morality Play, a model of moral expertise game with which to improve 
skills in different functional areas of morality. Video games of this type would allow the user to position 
him/herself for different virtual scenarios in which to apply and refine progress in the intellectual skills 
sought by SocrAI.
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plays a dominant role in the decision-making and learning process, firstly, by pro-
viding a tentative solution to the moral questions that arise and, then, by responding 
to the inquisitive scrutiny of that solution by the machine, as Socrates did, by formu-
lating questions and revealing flaws in the answers given by his interlocutor. Thanks 
to this interactive process, the user is compelled to reflect on their initial value posi-
tions and revise them where appropriate.
One might wonder to what extent the SocrAI user would want to participate in 
such a demanding interactive process in which he or she must be willing to respond 
to so many questions and suggestions from the computer, as well as to subsequently 
revise, where appropriate, postulates previously undisputed. I think the best way to 
get an idea of how collaborative the user’s stance might be would be to look into 
the educational possibilities of the Socratic method. These possibilities depend 
very much on how we understand the method itself. If, as in the early Platonic dia-
logues, the aim is to make the interlocutor aware of his or her ignorance through the 
Socrates’ own supposed ignorance, which, paradoxically, does not prevent Socrates 
from using a particular doctrine (as he does in the Meno), the resulting atmosphere 
can only be confrontational. In this case, "the process is generally not enjoyed by the 
interlocutors, and their reactions are often tense and hostile" (Brickhouse & Smith, 
2009, p. 188). The attitude of the interlocutor will change, however, if, as is evi-
dent in the Theaetetus, the instructor makes it clear that he is not an expert in any 
doctrine or substantive knowledge, but only in a technique which, like that of the 
midwife, grants others the ability to "give birth" themselves to genuine wisdom that 
Socrates does not really have. This other understanding of the Socratic method may 
favour a more cooperative attitude on the part of the interlocutor in two ways: either 
because the latter feels like part of a collective enquiry in which everyone shares the 
love of learning in a group (Cicchino, 2001; Mintz, 2006; Strong, 1997), or because 
an educated person can perceive the sincere contribution of an instructor who does 
not intend to indoctrinate him, but only to favour his own personal development. In 
the latter case, one would value the work of the instructor in the same way as one 
values the care work of the midwife who, following the analogy, only intends to 
provide the best possible care. It would be valued because the questioning of one’s 
own beliefs by the other is essentially productive (Brickhouse & Smith, 2009, p. 
189). For the SocrAI user to participate in the enhancement process, the first way 
would not be valid, as such communal and affective links between the machine and 
the human would hardly exist. The second way, according to which SocrAI could 
be seen as a non-human assistant at the mere service of deliberative enhancement, 
would appear more promising. However, we should not naïvely rule out any user dis-
couragement. The assistant’s rebuttals and observations will confuse him or her and, 
in many cases, lead him or her to abandon what he or she previously held to be true 
(let us not forget that this is also the essential aim of Socrates). In many cases, this 
will not be pleasant for the user.6 Even so, the discouragement may be compensated 
6 This predictably different response to the Socratic method is corroborated by the fact that in the Pla-
tonic dialogues not all the interviewees are enthusiastic about Socrates’ questions. Euthyphro is puzzled 
and abruptly ends the dialogue by postponing it for another time when he is not in such a hurry (Euthy-
phro, 15e). So does Protagoras (Protagoras, 361e). The provision of sufficient time for debate may be an 
important factor in ensuring that the embarrassment produced by the method translates into motivation 
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by the advantages and satisfaction of an examined life. As a certain version of the 
Socratic method intended, doubts and the recognition of our inconsistencies as the 
sole causes of our ignorance might give more meaning to our experiences and cir-
cumstances (Brickhouse & Smith, 1994, pp. 17–18, 2009, p. 190; Haroutunian-Gor-
don, 1991, p. 14). An incentive to be wiser may be even more potent in the case 
of the virtual assistant user because the virtual assistant, unlike Socrates, does not 
believe that what we should be aiming for is an objective and universal truth. By 
SocrAI only expecting us to exercise certain deliberative capacities, but without pre-
supposing substantive ethical principles, the fear of being led surreptitiously to some 
doctrine (as was the case with the early version of the dialogues) will be reduced, as 
will the trauma of having to abandon one’s own principles (since it will always be 
easier to abandon them due to their being based on conceptual, empirical or even 
ethical inaccuracies than because they are contrary to a single true ethical theory). 
Still, I must acknowledge that, ultimately, willingness to participate in the process 
will be reserved for those who, to some extent, share the Socratic maxim that "an 
unexamined life is not worth living" (Aporia, 38th).
Neutrality
There are therefore theoretical reasons to believe that the user of this technology, 
given certain conditions, would be motivated to actively participate in the constant 
interaction it would require. As we have seen, this interaction will be geared toward 
training the person for that personal and thoughtful adoption of values that charac-
terises autonomy. But clearly, in no case can we claim that the values adopted after 
this participatory process are distinctly those of the person if the process was heavily 
directed by some value framework entered into the system by the designer. I there-
fore highlight, as a third attribute to boost autonomy as self-determination, the fact 
that SocrAI would be designed to guarantee the neutrality of the system concerning 
substantive values. Moreover, this emphasis on maximum personal freedom would 
be bolstered by SocrAI being designed from the perspective of a strong commitment 
to the procedural values of minimal and open rationality.
For the latter, I rely in part on the idea of procedural moral enhancement pro-
posed by Schaefer and Savulescu (2019). Drawing on some ideas from J. Rawls’ 
reflective equilibrium method, these authors identify some criteria that, without pre-
supposing any substantive principles, could make people’s judgements more morally 
reliable. The criteria outlined in Lara & Deckers (2020, pp. 283–284) for the content 
and the sequences of the SocrAI questions coincided with some of those proposed in 
Schaefer and Savulescu (2019), particularly those pertaining to logical competence, 
Footnote 6 (continued)
for the interviewee, but his attention span, cultural level, argumentative practice or intellectual curiosity 
are likely to be important as well. How the interviewer poses the questions and the degree to which he or 
she uses the method will also matter, of course. For this purpose, published works on pedagogical expe-
riences with the Socratic method can be very useful. See, for example, McAllister (2018).
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conceptual understanding and empirical rigour. We thus considered that it would 
be important for the assistant to improve the user’s ability to, for example, argue 
according to logical rules or to detect fallacies in reasoning. We also proposed as 
functional criteria for SocrAI that, thanks to its extensive and rapid handling of 
big data, it should demand from the user fidelity to the facts and precision with 
regard to the concepts that are relevant in each moral judgement. When Schaefer 
and Savulescu (2019, p. 77) refer to the criterion of conceptual understanding, they 
include in this "a clear understanding of the content, strength and scope of moral 
ideas". This coincides with our requirement that the assistant should be designed to 
enrich the user’s decision-making with knowledge of the positions of the main ethi-
cal theories regarding the issue in question.
Our procedural enhancement proposal differed from that of Schaefer & 
Savulescu, however, in that we added two more functional criteria. First, we intro-
duced the monitoring of the user’s physiology, mental states and environment, alert-
ing the user of certain factors that could negatively affect his or her decision-mak-
ing and, second, the functionality of the assistant to recommend how to implement 
decisions.
In the remainder of the section, I wish to reinforce the emphasis of SocrAI on 
procedural neutrality by doing two things. First, by adding a new functional crite-
rion to those argued in Lara & Deckers (2020), thus enabling our decisions to be 
made from an empathetic perspective.7 Some may wonder whether this entails an 
attempt to direct the user toward certain substantive values such as it being fine to 
be concerned about the well-being of others. This would certainly be so if we were 
to understand empathy as the altruistic predisposition to feel like the other and, were 
this the case, to wish them not to suffer. But aside from “compassionate” (Batson, 
2009; Batson et al., 2009; Darwall, 1998), empathy can also be “cognitive” (Fisher 
2017, pp. 236–237; Seinfeld et al., 2018, p. 1; Bailenson, 2018, pp. 79–80). The lat-
ter is identified with a capacity to imagine how the other thinks and feels based on 
what he says or does and on the knowledge available regarding his character, values 
and desires. It would therefore consist of an emotionless capability to presume the 
subjective experience of someone occupying a different position, without entailing 
the desire to help them when the experience is painful. It is the demand for this type 
of cognitive empathy that could fit with a neutral and procedural proposal of moral 
enhancement like the one argued here.
This empathic capacity to determine how the other thinks and feels has tradi-
tionally been exercised in many ways: with extrapolations of profiles of like-minded 
people, mental experiments, psychological generalisations, etc. The aspiration com-
mon to these strategies is to overcome the limitations of our own imagination such 
as lack of relevant information, fatigue and biases. These limitations could be more 
easily surmounted, however, if our assistant drew on augmented and virtual reality 
7 This criterion is also included, albeit to a lesser extent, in Schaefer & Savulescu (2019, pp. 79–80)’s 
procedural proposal. In the same vein, Paulo (2018) advocates a “moral-epistemic enhancement” that 
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technologies strongly linked to AI to facilitate cognitive empathy (Rueda & Lara, 
2020). These technologies would provide the user with immersive experiences in 
computer-generated digital scenarios. By synchronising their real movements with 
those of the avatar in which they are embodied, the user could subjectively leave 
their physical reality and “be in” the projected virtual world (Shriram et al., 2017, p. 
312; Slater and Sanchez-Vives 2016; Fenlhofer et al. 2015, p. 49; Won et al., 2015, 
p. 6; Seinfeld et  al., 2018, p. 1). This would ensure a minimal imaginative effort 
required of the user to cognitively empathise with another since, to understand their 
perspective, the user would need only focus on the virtual experience (Banakou 
et al., 2016; Seinfeld et al., 2018, p. 7). A well-configured programme for this pur-
pose could provide a high degree of realism given the rich sensorial nuances that 
these new technologies would transmit to the user (Ahn et al., 2013, p. 10) and the 
fidelity to the intended perspective (Ramirez & LaBarge, 2018). Furthermore, if cer-
tain precautions are taken, such as using avatars to embody roles and not particular 
personalities (Herrera et al., 2018; Loon et al., 2018), these technologies could come 
close to obtaining an exclusively cognitive empathy free of biases.8
This particular efficiency of SocrAI to make the user understand how others think 
and feel in the most authentic way possible is essential to the neutral autonomy 
required in the field of morality. This autonomy is achieved when the person is in 
a position to independently attain values that, whilst also their own, since they are 
moral, must to some extent be universal. In other words, the values must be justifia-
ble with reasons formulated from this impersonal (neutral) perspective of equal con-
sideration of the beliefs and interests of all formally required by the field of morality.
The second thing I wish to do here to support the emphasis of SocrAI on neutral-
ity is to respond to the possible objection of whether this emphasis would lead to an 
ethical scepticism that would invalidate any attempt at moral enhancement. How can 
we say that progress has been made without a substantive value with which to evalu-
ate the change? Absent this value, the enhancement would be reduced —it would be 
objected— to a greater capacity for argument, regardless of the conclusion that may 
be reached. The result would then be the formation of an empty and false person 
through a virtual assistant closer to the sophists than the Socrates that we proposed 
as a reference.
However, in my opinion, this objection rests on an unfounded distrust in the nor-
mative achievements of a procedural ethic like the one underpinning my proposal. 
By just requiring, as this ethic does, that the judgments we assert be consistent, con-
ceptually precise and empirically founded, many of the most widely accepted moral 
positions would have to be rejected. Not just any substantive position would there-
fore suffice and those that pass these kinds of ethics tests could only be reflected in 
demanding and highly specific prescriptions.
8 The risks, which for the proposal defended here would involve not taking these kinds of precautions, 
are made clear in the current success of NGOs and institutions in using VR to raise public awareness 
regarding certain situations that breed suffering in animals and humans (Fisher 2017, pp. 233–236). They 
thus increase a compassionate empathy that, whilst justified in utilitarian terms, is partial and can easily 
be manipulated (Prinz 2011; Masto 2015, p. 76; Bloom 2016), often jeopardising the autonomy of the 
user.
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That said, it must be qualified that although value scepticism is not an inevitable 
consequence of our proposal, pluralism would be. We cannot forgo the premise that 
there can be several acceptable and irreconcilable value alternatives if we think that 
autonomy is characteristic of morality. Moreover, value plurality would also repre-
sent a good tool precisely for increasing that same autonomy. It will always be easier 
for the individual to critically determine their own moral judgments if the assistant 
presents, in a neutral manner, the widest range of procedurally valid ethical options 
possible.9 The Socratic appeal to personal inquiry through dialogue is therefore cru-
cial to being autonomous; but so is the sophist reminder that what is morally valid 
does not always concur.
SocrAI Versus the Socratic Teacher
The conclusion that we can draw from the above is that there are reasons to believe 
that if we wish to make use of technology to morally enhance individuals, SocrAI 
could be the ideal choice. Thanks to a dialectical method based on neutrality and 
deliberative rigour, this virtual assistant would strengthen the capacities necessary 
for making truly moral (autonomous) decisions. But it makes perfect sense to then 
wonder whether it is necessary to make use of technology to achieve this. Could 
we not do the same thing with human instructors who, in the style of Socrates him-
self, were to follow the same method as SocrAI? They would be philosophically 
and ethically trained instructors, with good oratorical skills, with access to all of the 
information available in computerised databases and who would converse with their 
pupils, from a point of neutrality, with the aim of better deliberation. To respond to 
this challenge, in this section I will compare those two hypothetical assistants, the 
virtual and the human, by virtue of their supposed advantages in terms of moral 
enhancement. I will focus on three aspects that I consider essential to the compari-
son: teaching skills, value neutrality and power to motivate.
Teaching Skills
To evaluate the efficiency of the educational function of both assistants, I will adhere 
to three criteria that I consider important: their information supply and management 
capacity, their agility in dialogue and their availability.
First, to satisfy the functional criteria of our procedural proposal (conceptual pre-
cision, empirical support, logical demands, etc.) both assistants should bolster their 
questions and suggestions to the individual with information on science, linguistics, 
9 This ethical pluralism contrasts with most of the current major systems for assistance in moral deci-
sion-making which always take the side of a particular ethical theory: the utilitarian JEREMY, the 
Rawlsian-Rossian MedEthEx or the casuistic Truth-Teller and SIROCCO  (Lara & Deckers, 2020, p. 
282). However, precisely due to these preferences, none of these systems can be universally acceptable. 
SocrAI, by contrast, would boast the advantage that, due to its ethical pluralism, it could be taken on by 
academics and users of a different ethical orientation.
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logic, argumentation theory, etc. It seems clear that although the human instructor 
could access the same databases as SocrAI to obtain this information, the latter, 
thanks to its AI resources, could process this information more quickly, tirelessly 
and in accordance with a greater number of parameters.
But the relevant information for the enhancement of decision-making would not 
come from databases alone. To this end, it would also be important for the individ-
ual to know at all times whether the conditions are suitable to decide. In this, tech-
nology could also be much more efficient. By monitoring the user and their environ-
ment, an assistant like SocrAI could obtain and utilise information regarding the 
existence of suitable mental and environmental conditions for deliberation faster and 
more efficiently than the human assistant. These include sufficient sleep, little time 
between meals, a lack of fatigue, absence of neuronal alterations, a lack of excessive 
heat and sound in the environment, etc. (Savulescu & Maslen 2015, pp. 85–86).
The virtual assistant would therefore be preferable with regard to the speed in 
obtaining and processing a large amount of information from databases and moni-
toring that proves relevant for improving decisions and, in the long-term, the capaci-
ties to make them autonomously. But this greater speed cannot be extended to all 
of the areas involved in the process, for example, the dialogue with the user. Dif-
ferent versions of Natural Language Processing are used to “converse” with virtual 
assistants which, due to their deficiencies in detecting many nuances and implicitly 
understood elements of human language, turn the dialogue with virtual assistants 
into something very slow and, at times, ineffective.10 Only time will tell if it will be 
possible to technically overcome such communicative deficiencies and the virtual 
assistant will reach, in this respect, the level of a human instructor, currently much 
more agile in dialogue.11
A third criterion for comparing the educational potential of SocrAI and its human 
opponent with regard to moral enhancement would be the degree to which both 
would be available. It appears that here, in principle, the former would be worse. 
It is anticipated that given its technical sophistication and consequent high cost, it 
would be beyond the reach of many of its potential users. Nevertheless, our expe-
rience with the marketing of other advanced technology products, such as mobile 
phones or computers, would justify the belief in a likely price reduction, over time, 
of virtual assistants and in their corresponding availability to the general public. 
This foreseeable process could even be accelerated if public institutions, aware of 
the social benefits of this type of assistant, invested in its development, made it 
available to underprivileged citizens through subsidies, or included it in the list of 
social services they offer to citizens.
Furthermore, if an assistant like SocrAI becomes commercially accessible, via 
price reduction or public subsidy, it would be more widely available than its human 
10 See, for example, the contrast between the argumentative efficiency and the slowness in the replies 
expressed by IBM’s Project Debater in its encounter in a debate competition with Naris Natarajan, a 
champion in this type of competition: https:// www. youtu be. com/ watch?v= 3_ yy0dn Ic58.
11 The achievements of the recent GPT-3, the great breakthrough in language generating systems—
referred to above in the text—may be decisive in bridging this gap.
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counterpart for the mere fact that machines can be used whenever the user desires, 
and not only on the days and times established for the necessarily regulated services 
of human instructors given their inherent professional and biological limitations. It 
should also be taken into account that, in contrast to the universal availability of 
a SocrAI thanks to multilingual translation applications, which are already quite 
advanced and easily used by the assistant, we would have human instructors who, 
due to their limitations in the learning of new languages, would have to be trained 
for different geolinguistic areas.
Neutrality
As we have seen, neutrality is important to the moral enhancement of individuals 
because it protects the process from potential attacks on personal autonomy. To that 
end, we proposed that the interaction between SocrAI and the individual be gov-
erned by strictly formal and procedural criteria, and thus detached from any bias that 
could excessively or surreptitiously influence them and thus limit the free and reflec-
tive pursuit of one’s own values.
It seems that this criterion of neutrality could be better satisfied by machines 
which, in principle—provided that they are not manipulated to do otherwise—, 
would be free from the biased emotions and attitudes that evolutionarily characterise 
human beings (Persson & Savulescu, 2012). But this initial lack of emotions inher-
ent in machines does not impede certain factors involved in their design, even when 
not knowingly biased, to impact the emotions of human users and compromise that 
neutrality and autonomy that would allow for their moral advancement. The follow-
ing precautions should be taken into account so that this does not occur.
First, the virtual assistant should be designed is such a way that the objective of 
its interaction with the user is limited, as my proposal advocates, to the better exer-
cise of strictly intellectual (cognitive and deliberative) capacities.
Second, to prevent—or to reduce as much as possible—the virtual assistant from 
generating emotions in humans that pervert their open value development, it should 
be designed without any discernible human or animal form. Recent studies show that 
companion robots, manufactured with the appearance of pets or human beings, elicit 
in the users consolidated emotions of attachment to the robots which even lead to 
attributing some type of mental state or social status to them (Friedman et al., 2003; 
Melson et al., 2009). Therefore, if a non-provocative design is used, the user would 
be emotionally distanced from the assistant, facilitating reflective independence.
With that same intention of optimally reducing emotional influences, we should 
expressly forgo the “affective computing” techniques with which automated systems 
aim to imitate user emotions and attitudes. Based on the psychological tendency for 
people of a similar nature to be attracted to each other, companion robots emotion-
ally identical to the user are designed with these techniques to gain their trust and 
thus fulfil their emotional deficits or make them change their unhealthy habits. In 
our case, it is clear that interaction based on this emotional affinity could lead to 
either an excessive dependence of the user on the assistant or easier manipulation of 
them by a malicious designer. In both cases, the results are counterproductive to a 
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virtual assistant that only seeks the development of intellectual abilities, with maxi-
mum autonomy.
It could be objected that the necessary lack of emotions in the relationship 
between the assistant and its user could detract from its effectiveness as, by making 
the assistant so cold, the user might experience a certain discomfort or demotivation. 
This would contrast—the objection would add—with an instruction carried out by a 
human with whom the relationship would never be as cold and which would free us 
from the strange sensation of performing an activity that is usually done between 
humans, debating or training, with the machine.
Even so, there are reasons to believe that this understandable perplexity in light 
of such a novel (conversational and formative) relationship with cold machines 
could gradually disappear. In fact, this has occurred in the past whenever, due to the 
advent of new technologies, we have begun to perform activities with machines that 
we previously did only with humans, such as talking on the telephone or shopping 
online. It should be added that this unemotional relationship between human and 
machine could even, in certain situations, be more efficient for moral enhancement. 
This would occur, for example, when the users are people who, due to their violent 
(Klincewicz, 2019, p. 443), irritable or shy nature have difficulties interacting with a 
human instructor.
Motivation
Given that the aim is to devise an assistant for moral enhancement, it is obvious 
that it must not function solely for the user to be aware of the deficiencies in their 
decisions and to know how to avoid them. It must also be useful so that, in practice, 
these new skills will cause them to alter their values and behaviour. First, neither 
of our two assistants would be very good at this, as both aim to influence only the 
deliberative and rational aspects of the person, but not the motivational. I have even 
argued that the design of the virtual assistant, in order to preserve autonomy and 
neutrality, should be particularly careful not to directly influence the user’s emo-
tions, which are the quintessential source of motivation.
This notwithstanding, I believe that both assistants could overcome this motiva-
tional deficit without having to thereby abandon their common aim of exclusively 
intellectual enhancement. I therefore rely on what we can call the persuasive power 
of reason. Whilst it may be true that an argument on its own is not motivational 
because it is formally differentiable from desires and emotions, which are the quin-
tessential engines for action, these desires and emotions can also be triggered by a 
strongly convincing argument. In this sense, it can then be argued that both assis-
tants for argumentative deliberation could at least be indirectly motivational.
Furthermore, it makes sense to expect that, in reality, our two assistants, even 
though only concerned with intellectual matters, would be highly effective for atti-
tudinal change in the recipient of the instruction. For this expectation, we could 
rely on the plausible assumption that the arguments are ultimately more motivat-
ing when, in addition to being convincing, they are the result of personal effort. It 
follows from our previous remarks on the Socratic method that both SocrAI and 
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our Socratic teacher would invite participation because they would follow a version 
of this method that does not aim to direct them according to a predetermined sub-
stantive framework of values. The objective is to help them to decide on their own 
and with strict neutrality. The individual will therefore always perceive the decisions 
resulting from the dialogue with the virtual assistant, or with the human instructor, 
as their own and this will make them much more motivating. Moreover, the moti-
vational force of the decisions will increase even more as the individual considers 
that such decisions are the result of a demanding learning process in which it was 
constantly necessary to debate with an expert.
Both assistants could thus become more motivating than they might have origi-
nally seemed. But, would one of them be preferable in this regard? There are reasons 
to believe that SocrAI would be preferable, especially due to that persuasive force 
derivable from the positive valuation that the user would make of the deliberative 
process. In my opinion, people would appreciate the arguments more when they 
come from a dialogue with a virtual assistant because the observations it makes, 
provided that certain precautions are taken, could seem more reliable than those of 
the human instructor. This assertion would make sense according to the two main 
dimensions from which trust is understood (Roff & Danks, 2018). On the one hand, 
there is the trust we normally place in machines and artefacts, which is largely a 
matter of predictability and reliability. In line with this, there are studies that sug-
gest that the degree of trustworthiness generated in us by computerised and auto-
mated systems really depends on the effectiveness that we expect from them. This 
expectation of effectiveness stems from our beliefs about how many problems we 
consider them to have been able to resolve in the past, and how many we anticipate 
they will resolve in future situations (Carlson et  al., 2014, p. 4). If we use these 
criteria to compare the trust that our two assistants would generate, it is foreseeable 
that the virtual one would be evaluated more positively, given the widespread belief 
that machines lack many of the cognitive and volitional limitations characteristic 
of humans (Muir, 1987; Klincewizc, 2016, p.  181). As such, SocrAI could boost 
its (indirect) motivating force—and by far surpass the human Socrates—if it were 
designed to provide convincing evidence of its effectiveness. In this case, this would 
not be achieved by showing its success rate or making its decisions more under-
standable, as some authors recommend for automated systems in general (Lee & 
See, 2004), but rather by allowing the user to pause the dialogue at any time in order 
to demand that the assistant explain the origin and authority of the source of the data 
being used in its questions and suggestions.
But, on the other hand, there is the much more complicated form of trust, more 
characteristic of interpersonal relationships, which depends mainly on understand-
ing rather than predicting the other’s behaviour. It is necessary to understand the 
underlying values, preferences and beliefs that present a reason for his or her course 
of action. Regarding this second dimension of trust, in our case, the expectations 
that SocrAI or the human instructor arouse in us will depend very much on how we 
conceive the ontology of the virtual assistant. Given the limited degree of autono-
mous learning and its lack of other more complex aspects, such as consciousness, 
SocrAI’s behaviour will leave less room for misunderstanding and the expectations 
generated will always be stronger. On the contrary, the expectations of the Socratic 
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instructor’s disciple will always remain at the mercy of an unexpected response, 
understandable by the much more autonomous and emotional nature of humans.
Another aspect of SocrAI that would present it as more motivating than its 
human counterpart has to do with the potential for its use of VR technology in 
increasing the cognitive empathy referred to earlier. We should not forget that the 
problem here is how to translate the decisions reached into a willingness of the 
individual to act accordingly and, as they are based on deliberations of morality, 
that they must be based on reasons adopted from the impersonal point of view 
that characterises this normative field. SocrAI would do this better because, by 
allowing the user to virtually embody the role of other involved subjects, their 
perspectives could be more faithfully and vividly understood and the user would 
thus feel more inclined to take them seriously and act impersonally.
Conclusion
The key in moral education is that it be pursued while respecting and promoting 
personal autonomy. Educators should avoid the mistake of limiting the capacities 
of individuals to freely and reflectively determine their own values by attempting 
to enhance their behaviour directly. On the contrary, they must do what they can 
to ensure that those being educated, at least at an advanced age, actively partici-
pate in this process in order to assume the values that will define them and give 
meaning to their lives. The problem with current proposals for moral enhance-
ment through new technologies is that they treat the subject of their interventions 
as a "passive recipient". Moral bioenhancement does so because it aims to change 
the motivation of the individual by bypassing the reflection and gradual assimila-
tion of values that should accompany any adoption of new identity traits. This 
constitutes a passivity that would also occur in proposals for moral AIenhance-
ment based on ethical machines that either replace humans in decision-making, or 
surreptitiously direct them to do the right thing, or simply advise them based on 
their own supposedly undisputed values.
In this article, I have developed and justified a new moral AIenhance-
ment model focused on autonomy. It involves a virtual assistant that, rather 
than making moral decisions for us, instructs us, through dialogue, so that we 
make them ourselves by following criteria of neutrality and deliberative rigour. 
I have also argued that although, in principle, this could be achieved through a 
human instructor using a similar method of instruction, it would be significantly 
improved with the proposed virtual assistant, provided that progress in its com-
municative capacity is made, that people can acquire access to it, and that par-
ticular precautions are taken in its design so that, for example, it does not directly 
influence the user’s emotions and the sources of its observations are transparent, 
thus generating maximum confidence.
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